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Three Prosecutors Look at the New
Pennsylvania Crimes Code
Martin H. Belsky*
Joseph Dougherty**
Steven H. Goldblatt***
On December 6, 1972, a new Crimes Code, was approved, to be ef-
fective June 6, 1973.2 The new Crimes Code is the first real legislative
attempt since 1860 to codify the criminal laws of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania.3 However, because of political realities, it is not a
complete codification, but rather an attempt to restructure only those
provisions found in the former Penal Code.4
In the comments of the Joint State Government Commission, 5 the
drafters of the new Crimes Code sought to convince the legislature and
the public that few substantive changes had been made., In fact, by the
elimination of common law offenses, 7 the grading of offenses,8 the
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Federal Bars; Instructor in Law, Temple University School of Law; Assistant District
Attorney, Chief of Adult Prosecution, District Attorney's Office of Philadelphia.
S B.S., LaSalle College (1953); J.D., Temple University (1958); Member of the Pennsyl-
vania Bar; Adjutant Professor, Rutgers University; Assistant District Attorney, Chief of
Indictment Division, District Attorney's Office of Philadelphia.
0*0 B.A., Franklin & Marshall College (1967): J.D., Georgetown University (1970);
Assistant District Attorney, Chief of Motions Division, District Attorney's Office of Phila-
delphia.
1. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 101-5201 (1973).
2. Id. § 101.
3. The Penal Code of 1939, Act of June 24, 1939, Pa. P.L. 872, did collect some of
the criminal statutes but retained common law offenses and relied on common law defini-
tions.
4. Crimes found in other volumes, such as narcotics, drugs, traffic and cigarette tax
offenses were left unaffected. In addition, provisions concerning the death penalty, homo-
sexuality, wiretapping, and abortion were left unaffected.
5. After enactment of the new Crimes Code, these comments were revised and published
as PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMENTS RELATING TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE CRIMES
CODE [hereinafter referred to as PBA COMMENTS].
6. For example, the PBA COMMENTS, supra note 5, at 6, states that CONSOL. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 308 (1973), merely "delineates the defense" of intoxication or drugged con-
dition already established in Pennsylvania common law. In fact, by stating that "evidence
of intoxicationor drugged condition ... may be offered . . . whenever relevant to negative
an element of the offense," the provisions encourage challenges to prosecution for any
offense which involves as an "element," proof of culpability such as intent or knowledge.
7. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 107(b) (1973).
8. See id. §§ 106, 1101-05.
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mandating of jury instructions, 9 and the establishment of new de-
fenses, 10 the Crimes Code did in fact make changes in the substantive
criminal law and, in addition, to the entire administration of criminal
justice.
This article will seek to explore some of the practical problems, from
making a lawful arrest, through preparation of indictments, to trial,
that have resulted from the new Crimes Code.'
I. ARREST
A. The Misdemeanor-Felony Distinction and the Grading of Offenses
Rule 102 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure pre-
cludes an arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or a summary
offense under the Vehicle Code, not committed in the presence of the
arresting police officer, and requires the victim to swear out a complaint
in those cases.' 2 With the creation of graded offenses by the new Crimes
Code, this rule can lead to serious legal problems for police officers
seeking to apprehend offenders.' 3
9. See, e.g., id. §§ 302(b), 3106.
10. See, e.g., id. §§ 109-11, 501-06.
11. One problem, of course, is communicating the meaning of the new Crimes Code
provisions to counsel, judges, prosecutors and police. In Philadelphia, the District Attorney's
Office worked closely with the Philadelphia Police Department in preparing training pro-
grams, pamphlets and material for patrolmen, detectives and supervisory staff. In addition
the office has prepared a book, seeking to clarify the legalistic language of the Crimes
Code and to provide commentary to and explanation of the provisions. See S. GOLDBLATr &
M. BELSKY, ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY TO THE PENNSYLVANIA CRIMES CODE (1973). Copies
of this analysis have been given to all judges and District Attorneys of the Commonwealth
as well as to many police departments, justices of the peace and attorneys.
12. PA. R. CIuM. P. 102 provides:
Criminal Proceedings may be instituted by:
1. A written complaint in any case.
2. An arrest without a warrant upon probable cause when the offense is a felony.
3. An arrest without a warrant when the offense is a felony or misdemeanor com-
mitted in the presence of the arresting person.
4. An arrest without a warrant when the offense is a summary offense under The
Vehicle Code committed in the presence of a police officer, provided the police
officer is in uniform.
5. An arrest without a warrant when the offense is a summary offense which involves
a breach of the peace, endangers property or the safety of any person present,
provided the police officer displays a badge or other sign of authority or is in
uniform.
6. A citation when the offense is a summary offense under The Vehicle Code, pro-
vided the police officer is in uniform.
7. A citation when the offense is any other summary offense, provided the police
officer displays a badge or other sign of authority or is in uniform.
13. An analogous problem occurred prior to the enactment of the Crimes Code because
of rule 102. Evidence essential for prosecutions for drunken driving or involuntary man-
slaughter was often suppressed because of an arrest deemed illegal under rule 102. An
officer coming upon the scene of an accident can often tell to a substantial degree of
certainty that one of the drivers involved is intoxicated. Rule 102 prevents the subsequent
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One typical illustration is the grading of "stealing offenses" from
robbery to four degrees of theft. Under the Crimes Code14 a theft may
be elevated to robbery, a first degree felony,1 if an offender inflicts or
threatens serious bodily injury or commits or threatens to commit a
felony of the first or second degree (such as arson) 6 in the course of
committing the theft. All other thefts17 are misdemeanors,", unless the
amount involved exceeds $2,000, or the property stolen is a firearm or
automobile, or the defendant is accused of being a receiver of stolen
property and is shown to be in the business of buying or selling stolen
property, in which case the theft is a felony of the third degree. 19
If a victim of a purse snatch calls for the police, complains of the of-
use of a breathalyzer test or blood sample in a prosecution, even for manslaughter, if
obtained without a search or arrest warrant, in spite of the presence of probable cause
and the reasonableness of the arrest. Delay to serve a warrant could easily result in the
loss of evidence and conviction as the presence of alcohol on the breath or in the blood
dissipates over time.
The problem is not an academic one. In Commonwealth v. Reeves, 223 Pa. Super. 51,
297 A.2d 142 (1972), the court upheld a lower court suppression of the results of a defen-
dant's blood test because the test was administered incident to an illegal arrest. The arrest
was illegal solely because it was warrantless, and both operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicants and involuntary manslaughter are misdemeanors. See
Commonwealth v. Brown, 225 Pa. Super. 289, 302 A.2d 475 (1973).
14. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3701(a) (1973), provides:
(1) A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he:
(i) inflicts serious bodily injury upon another;
(ii) threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate serious
bodily injury; or
(iii) commits or threatens immediately to commit any felony of the first or second
degree.
(2) An act shall be deemed "in the course of committing a theft" if it occurs in an
attempt to commit theft or in flight after the attempt or commission.
15. Id. § 3701(b). A felony in the first degree is punishable with a maximum penalty of
twenty years and/or $25,000. Id. §§ 1101(1), 1103(1).
16. Arson endangering persons is a first degree felony. Arson endangering property is
a second degree felony. Id. § 3301.
17. See id. §§ 3901-31 (chapter 39--theft and related offenses).
18. Thefts not rising to robbery or a felony of the third degree as described in the text
are misdemeanors of the first degree if the amount taken is $200 or more or if the property
taken is from the person or by threat, or in breach of a fiduciary duty. All other thefts are
misdemeanors of the second degree if the amount is $50 or more and of the third degree
if less than $50. See id. § 3903(b).
A first degree misdemeanor is punishable with a maximum penalty of five years and/or
$10,000. Id. §§ 1101(3), 1104(1). A second degree misdemeanor is punishable with a max-
imum penalty of two years and/or $5,000. Id. §§ 1101(9), 1104(2). A third degree mis-
demeanor is punishable with a maximum penalty of one year and/or $2,500. Id. §§ 1101(5),
1104(3).
Unauthorized use of a vehicle, theft of trade secrets and retail theft are separately
defined and punished by the Crimes Code. See id. §§ 3928-30.
19. Id. § 3903(a), provides:
Theft constitutes a felony of the third degree if the amount involved exceeds $2,000,
or if the property stolen is a firearm, automobile, airplane, motorcycle, motorboat or
other motor-propelled vehicle, or in the case of theft by receiving stolen property, if
the receiver is in the business of buying or selling stolen property.
A felony of the third degree is punishable with a maximum penalty of seven years and/
or $15,000. Id. §§ 1101(2), 1103(3).
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fense, and points to an individual running away, a literal reading of
rule 102 might seem to require detailed questioning by the officer of
an obviously shaken victim in order to determine the amount of loss,
the nature of the property taken, and the nature of the harm or threats,
if any, in order to determine if the offense is a felony justifying a war-
rantless arrest. Such a requirement could obviously delay apprehension
of the suspect and could easily result in the offender's escape. More-
over, the likelihood of immediate, detailed, and clear responses from
a shaken victim are minimal. Finally, if the responses do not match the
requirements for robbery or felonious theft, literal readings of the rule
might completely preclude any immediate attempts to apprehend the
offender and would thereby result in the failure to ever apprehend
him.20
At the time of the victim's report at or near the scene of the crime-
the only time that the offender is likely to be apprehended-the police
officer is unreasonably asked to make a complicated legal judgment to
determine what grade or degree of theft was involved.
If the officer fails to make an arrest of an offender who is subse-
quently charged with a felony, he could be charged with incompetency
or worse. If the officer proceeds to arrest an offender who is subsequently
charged with a misdemeanor, the effect might be felt in the courtroom
when physical evidence acquired during a search incident to an unlaw-
ful arrest is suppressed.
No interest of society is served by dismissing charges against one
who, by mere chance, is a misdemeanant, not a felon. The fourth
amendment requires no such ironic result.21
The obvious answer to the problem raised by this example,22 is to
20. Such literal interpretations are not completely unlikely. See Commonwealth v.
Reeves, 223 Pa. Super. 51, 297 A.2d 142 (1972); Commonwealth v. Vassiljev, 218 Pa. Super.
215, 275 A.2d 852 (1971).
21. While some warrantless arrests are invalid, see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 482 (1971), where probable cause exists an arrest warrant is not a constitutional
prerequisite to an arrest or a search incident thereto. United States v. Miles, 468 F.2d 482,
486 (3d Cir. 1972); Commonwealth v. Marino, 435 Pa. 245, 252, 255 A.2d 911, 918 (1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1077 (1970).
22. Numerous other illustrations could be detailed. For example, if one is suspected
of stealing an auto, a felony under CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3903 (1973), he may be
charged with the misdemeanor of unauthorized use of an automobile under id. § 3928;
if one is suspected of disorderly activity, he may be charged with the summary or misde-
meanor offense of disorderly conduct under id. § 5503 or the third degree felony of riot
under id. § 5501; if one is suspected of giving a false statement, he may be charged with
the misdemeanor of false swearing or unsworn falsification, id. §§ 4103-04, or the felony
of perjury under id. § 4902. In these cases, like the theft example in the text, evidence
obtained with probable cause might be suppressed under rule 102.
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alter the rule concerning warrantless arrests.28 Either the legislature 24
or the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Criminal Rules Committee25 must
adopt the appropriate revisions.
B. The Retail Theft Provision and the Arrest of Shoplifters
Under the 1939 Penal Code, a shoplifter was charged with a sum-
mary offense,26 released on copy or citation, and given a hearing within
days.27 Recidivistic offenders could be charged with the summary of-
fense of shoplifting again or with the felony of larceny.2 Often the
felony would be reduced by the justice of the peace or magistrate to
the summary offense of shoplifting.29 In any event, convictions were
few, fines low, and imprisonment doubtful.
In response to the requests of the Pennsylvania Retailer's Associa-
tion, 0 the new Crimes Code creates a new offense of "retail theft"3' in
23. See, e.g., N.Y. CuM. PRO. LAw § 140.10(l)(b) (1971), which provides:
A police officer may arrest a person for . .. a crime when he has reasonable cause
to believe that such a person has committed such crime whether in his presence or
otherwise.
Id. (emphasis added).
24. Currently, the General Assembly of Pennsylvania is considering House Bill No. 1082
which would add a new section 113 "Arrest Without Warrant" to chapter 1 of the Crimes
Code. The important provisions of that proposed section are:
(a) General Note-A law enforcement officer shall have the same right of arrest with-
out a warrant for a graded offense as exists or may hereafter exist in the case of the
commission of a felony.
(b) Conviction of misdemeanor on summary offense-an arrest without a warrant for
a graded offense shall not be invalidated solely by reason of the fact that defendant
was convicted of a misdemeanor or summary offense.
25. The District Attorney's Office of Philadelphia has proposed one possible rule
change-to simply include within rule 102 a provision that "Criminal proceedings may be
instituted by ... an arrest without a warrant upon probable cause when the offense is a
felony or a misdemeanor."
26. Act of June 24, 1939, Pa. P.L. 872, § 816.1.
27. See PA. R. CRim. P. 102 providing for citation for summary offenses.
28. Act of June 24, 1939, Pa. P.L. 872, § 807.
29. In response to this practice, the new Crimes Code, CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 3929(e) (1973), provides that "no justice of the peace or other magistrate shall have the
power to reduce any other charge of theft to a charge of retail theft ...."
30. See PBA CommENtsS, supra note 5, at 21 stating that CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 3929 (1973), is "patterned on retail theft legislation proposed by the Pennsylvania Re-
tailer's Association."
31. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3929(a) (1973), which defines retail theft as where
any person:
(1) takes possession of any merchandise offered for sale by any store or other retail
mercantile establishment with the intention of converting it to his own use without
paying to the owner the value thereof; or
(2) alters, transfers or removes any label, price tag or marking upon any merchandise
offered for sale by any store or other retail mercantile establishment; or
(3) transfers any merchandise offered for sale by any store or other retail mercantile
establishment from the container in or on which the same shall be displayed to any
other container with intent to deprive the owner of all or some part of the value
thereof.
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place of the earlier crime of shoplifting. 32 In addition to introducing
welcome reforms in the proof of the crime33 and the apprehension of
offenders3 4 the provision grades retail theft offenses independently of
the general theft statute.
Retail theft of merchandise of $100 or more is a first degree misde-
meanor;3 5 retail theft of merchandise of less than $100 is a summary
offense the first time,36 a second degree misdemeanor the second time3 7
and a first degree misdemeanor the third and subsequent time.
38
The new provision, however, creates difficult administrative prob-
lems that could lead to unreasonable delays in arrest and unintended
leniency in prosecution, By punishing recidivists as misdemeanants
"upon conviction of a second offense"39 or "upon commission of a third
or any subsequent offense," 40 the provision indicates that increased
penalties should be given upon multiple convictions. Unanswered are
the problems of recidivists, convicted of shoplifting under the 1939
Penal Code or arrested and not yet convicted of retail theft under the
Crimes Code. It has been argued that one starts "anew" under the
Crimes Code. Thus, a three or four time convicted shoplifter could
only be charged with the summary retail theft provision for any new
arrest after June 6, 1973. Similarly, it can be argued that one arrested
for the summary offense of retail theft can be charged, upon subsequent
arrest, with the misdemeanor of retail theft only if he has been con-
victed of this first charge.41 Until then, no prior "offense" has legally
been committed.
32. See PBA COMmENTS, supra note 5, at X.
33. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3929(c) (1973), creates a prima facie presumption
that intentional concealment of unpurchased properties indicated an intention to convert
the property to one's own use without paying the purchase price.
34. Id. § 3929(d), allows a police officer or merchant to detain for a reasonable time on
probable cause a suspected offender in or outside the premises in order to secure identifi-
cation, recover stolen merchandise and institute criminal proceedings.
35. Id. § 3929(b)(4). A first degree misdemeanor has a maximum penalty of five years
and/or $10,000. Id. §§ 1101(3), 1104(1).
36. Id. § 3929(b)(1). A summary offense has a maximum penalty of ninety days and/or
$300. Id. §§ 1101(6), 1105.
37. Id. § 3929(b)(2). A second degree misdemeanor has a maximum penalty of two years
and/or $5,000. Id. §§ 1101(4), 1104(2).
38. Id. § 3929(b)(3). A first degree misdemeanor has a maximum penalty of five years
and/or $10,000. Id. §§ 1101(3), 1104(1).
39. Id. § 3929(b)(2).
40. Id. § 3929(b)(3).
41. While first listing of a retail theft summary could be in days, the hearing and
conviction could be much later, possibly due to the failure of an offender to appear at his
hearing. In addition, even conviction before a justice of the peace or magistrate may not
be considered a final conviction, allowing application of the recidivist provisions, since an
offender has the right to appeal for a hearing de novo to a common pleas court judge.
See Minor Judiciary Court Appeals Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 3001-07 (1968).
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For a police officer, the difficulties are obvious. He must make a de-
tailed record check to determine prior convictions or release the de-
fendant on citation. If he does not take the necessary time to make the
check, or if the records are inaccurate, a defendant could be tried
within days, receive a minor penalty, and be released. Reprosecution,
upon learning that an individual is a convicted recidivist, is forever
precluded.42 If a prior record is found but is limited to shoplifting
convictions under the old Penal Code, or arrests under the new Crimes
Code, the officer could be forced to release the defendant on a copy of
the citation and leave the penalty to the hearing judge. If a police
officer avoids such dilemmas and charges all such offenders with a mis-
demeanor, only to later find out it was a summary offense, he has
created additional and burdensome paperwork for himself, his depart-
ment, and the courts. In addition, he has not only forced taxpayers'
dollars to be spent for these procedures, but also for the time of a prose-
cutor and defense counsel, if the offender is indigent.
Similarly, by providing for punishment as a first degree misdemean-
ant, whether a first, second, third or subsequent offense, whenever the
value of the merchandise taken is $100,43 the provision indicates a de-
sire to increase punishment for the serious and professional shoplifter.
However, by failing to provide any provision for accumulation, as
found in the general theft section, 44 it leaves a gaping loophole in en-
forcement. For example, if an offender visited several stores in a shop-
ping center but took only $99 worth of wares from each, he could not
be charged with a first degree misdemeanor because of the value of the
goods taken; he could not be charged as a misdemeanant solely because
of the multiple thefts on the same day and in the same arrest. He could
only be charged with a number of summary offenses, receiving the
minimum, rather than the maximum, penalties.
Some of the problems can be resolved by new police and prosecution
procedures. Retail establishments can keep their own records as to re-
peated offenders. Accurate and speedy record checking devices must
42. See CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 110 (1973) (when prosecution barred by former
prosecution for different offense); Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432
(1973).
43. CONSOL. PA. STAT. AN. tit. 18, § 3929(4).(1973).
44. Id. § 3903(c), relating to the general theft provisions, states that . . . amounts
involved in thefts committed pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct, whether from
the same person or several persons, may be aggregated in determining the grade of the
offense."
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be maintained. Use of prosecution under the general theft statute45
should be considered for recidivistic offenders not fitting into the strict
requirements of the retail theft provision" and for commercial thefts
involving property of considerable value.47
C. Use of Force in Making an Arrest and Aggravated Assault and
Battery
One common and justified complaint of many police officers is that
society asks them to make sophisticated legal judgments as to the le-
gality of an arrest. For example, what is or is not probable cause has
been the subject of extensive litigation; when a warrant is or is not re-
quired can be the basis of considerable controversy. The Crimes Code
seeks to lessen this burden but it only goes half-way and this results in
possible confusion.
In establishing justifications for the use of force,48 the Crimes Code
is very specific in stating that a citizen does not have the right to resist
an arrest, whether lawful or unlawful. 49 The obvious purpose of this
is to preclude needless violence where a citizen believes he is being un-
lawfully arrested or even harassed. His remedy is nonviolent action
against the police officer, either through internal police disciplinary
proceedings, ° or to the courts through criminal prosecution, 51 or civil
litigation.52
Unfortunately, while providing that resistance to an unlawful arrest
is not justifiable, the Crimes Code nevertheless excuses that resistance.
45. Id. § 3921(a), provides that one ' . . is guilty of theft if he unlawfully takes, or
exercises unlawful control over, movable property of another with intent to deprive him
thereof."
46. There is no provision prohibiting prosecution under the general theft provisions
in addition to or in lieu of prosecution under the retail theft provision.
47. Depending on the nature and value of the merchandise, the penalty could be felony
of the third degree, or a misdemeanor of the first, second or third degree. It would never
be a summary offense. See CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3903 (1973). See also note 18
supra.
48. Chapter five, id. §§ 501-10, describes the various justification defenses available.
49. Id. § 505(b)(1)(i), specifically provides:
The use of force is not justifiable .. . to resist an arrest which the actor knows is
being made by a police officer, although the arrest is unlawful ....
50. In Philadelphia, for example, such a complaint could be made to the Police Internal
Security Division and result in an administrative hearing before the Police Board of In-
quiry.
51. The District Attorney's Office of Philadelphia has established a separate division to
investigate brutality and other complaints against the police. Prosecutions for assault and
battery, (CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2701-02 (1973)) harassment (id. § 2709) or
official oppression (id. § 5301) can result.
52. Complaints, seeking money damages, can be filed in state courts, for assault, battery,
or invasion of privacy, and in federal courts for the violation of an individual's civil rights.
800
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It is a misdemeanor of the second degree's to resist an arrest-but only
if that arrest is lawful.5 It is a misdemeanor of the first degree 5 5 -to
attempt or cause bodily injury to a police officer making or attempting
to make an arrest-but only if that arrest is lawful.56 It is a felony of
the second degree57 to attempt or cause serious bodily injury to police
officers making or attempting to make an arrest-but again only if that
arrest is lawful.58
Moreover, even if a lawful arrest is made, these provisions only pun-
ish an offender where bodily injury is involved. Thus, under the defi-
nition of bodily injury,59 minor scuffling or even fighting by a defendant
seeking to resist an arrest is not punishable. 0
If the purpose of the provision eliminating a right to resist is to
deter, it has failed. Failure to follow the requirement is without effect
if one was right about the legality of the arrest. Failure to follow the
requirement is also without effect even if one is wrong and no bodily
injury results.
IL INDICTMENTS
A. Delays in Indictments
Prior to enactment of the new Crimes Code, delays in indictment
could easily lead to the termination of prosecutions because of the
statute of limitations.8 1 This led to difficult problems of administration
53. A misdemeanor of the second degree is punishable with a maximum penalty of
two years and/or $5,000. CoNsoL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1101(4), 1104(2) (1973).
54. Id. § 5104, provides that one is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree ".
if, with the intent of preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful arrest . . . the
person creates a substantial risk of bodily injury .... " Id. (emphasis added).
55. A misdemeanor of the first degree is punishable with a maximum penalty of five
years and/or $10,000. Id. §§ 1101(3), 1104(1).
56. Id. § 2702(a)(3), provides one is guilty if he "... attempts to cause or intentionally
or knowingly causes bodily injury to a police officer making or attempting to make a
lawful arrest." Id. (emphasis added).
57. A felony of the second degree is punishable with a maximum penalty of ten years
and/or $25,000. Id. §§ 1101(1), 1103(1).
58. Id. § 2702(a)(2), provides one is guilty if he "... attempts to cause or intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly causes serious bodily injury to a police officer making or attempting
to make a lawful arrest .... " Id. (emphasis added).
59. Id. § 2301, defines "bodily injury" as "impairment of physical condition or sub-
stantial pain."
Similarly "serious bodily injury" is "bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of
death on which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment
of the function of any bodily member or organ." Id.
60. See PBA COMMENTS, supra note 5, at 29, describing CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 104 (1973), as changing "existing law somewhat by not extending to minor scuffling
which occasionally takes place during an arrest."
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 211 (1964), provided that indictments for treason, arson,
801
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and procedure and sometimes to the dismissal of prosecutions without
any real fault on the part of the Commonwealth. For example, under
the constitutional and statutory provisions establishing the municipal
court,62 no indictment was possible for any offense punishable by five
years or less63 until after sentencing in the municipal court. Rules pro-
vided that pre-trial motions to suppress evidence would be heard at
trial.64 If a difficult motion was presented, requiring the preparation of
briefs and an opinion, trial could be delayed for months. If the decision
of the motion was adverse to the Commonwealth, it could appeal first
to the common pleas court 5 and then to the superior or supreme court.
Such procedures, fully permissible and justifiable, could lead to months
and even years of delay. As most of the offenses involved in these cases
had a two year statute of limitations, the inability to indict could result
in the dismissal of the prosecution.
The new Crimes Code provisions fortunately resolve these prob-
lems. While providing basically the same periods as the 1939 Penal
Code,6 6 the new time limitations provision provides that the limitations
only apply to the "commencement" of prosecution. A prosecution is
commenced either "when an indictment is found or when an arrest or
summons is issued." 67 Because a warrant or summons must be issued
before68 or almost immediately after6" arrest, incidental delays caused
by municipal court procedures will no longer jeopardize prosecutions.
B. Defective Indictments Or Indictment Procedures
Recent cases in the Pennsylvania appellate courts have held that de-
fects in indictments or in indictment procedures would not toll the
statute of limitations. In a series of cases, 70 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure 7x re-
sodomy, buggery, robbery, burglary, perjury, counterfeiting or writing of a forged or
counterfeit note had to be brought within five years after the offense. All other crimes
had to be indicted within two years, except for murder and voluntary manslaughter which
had no time limitation.
62. PA. CONST. art. V, § 6. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 711.1-881 (Supp. 1973).
63. Act of October 17, 1969, Pa. P.L. 259, § 18, as amended Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 711.18(Supp. 1973).
64. PA. R. CRiM. P. 6005(b).
65. Commonwealth v. Hallowell, 223 Pa. Super. 440, 302 A.2d 337 (1973); PA. R. CraM.
P. 6005(c).
66. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 108(a),(b) (1973).
67. Id. § 108(e).
68. PA. R. Cum. P. 102, 107.
69. Id. 118.
70. Commonwealth v. Collemacine, 429 Pa. 24, 239 A.2d 296 (1968); Commonwealth v.
Dessus, 423 Pa. 177, 224 A.2d 188 (1966).
71. PA. R. Cium. P. 203.
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quire that a defendant must be given a reasonable opportunity to chal-
lenge the grand jury and to challenge individual grand jurors for
cause.7 2 In order to effectuate that right the accused or his counsel had
to be notified as to which grand jury his case would be presented.7 8
Failure to satisfy these requirements led to the quashing of the indict-
ments. Many defendants waited until the statutory time limitation had
passed to quash their indictments based on these cases and they were
successful, even to prosecutions pre-dating these decisions.74 When
prosecutors sought to re-indict, the courts held that they were barred
because the statute of limitations had passed.75
Such problems could not occur under the new Crimes Code. In its
time limitation provision, the Crimes Code makes it explicit that the
statutory limitation period does not run "during any time when a
prosecution against the accused for the same conduct is pending in this
Commonwealth. '70
C. New Procedures
In order to implement the new Crimes Code, new indictments had
to be prepared relating a criminal incident to the new relevant Crimes
Code offenses. The District Attorney's Office of Philadelphia has pre-
pared a model set of indictments, one hundred and seventy-seven in all,
involving one hundred and sixty-four indictable offenses. In order to
avoid legal problems as to complex or graded offenses, clarity was ob-
tained by making use of different counts in a single bill of indictment 77
and by scrupulously abiding by the exact language of the statute.
Because of the need for standardization and speed, these new indict-
ments are printed out by a computer, in accordance with the results of
the preliminary hearing, municipal court trial, or district attorney's
review.78 Because of the efficiency of these procedures, prosecutions
based on the new indictments have proceeded without serious chal-
lenge in the courts.
72. Commonwealth v. Dessus, 423 Pa. 177, 188-89, 224 A.2d 188, 197-98 (1966).
73. Commonwealth v. Collemacine, 429 Pa. 24, 27, 239 A.2d 298 (1968).
74. Commonwealth v. Rosenfeld, 220 Pa. Super. 105, 283 A.2d 870 (1971).
75. Commonwealth v. Cardonick, 448 Pa. 322, 292 A.2d 402 (1972).
76. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 108(F)(2) (1973).
77. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 219(b), providing for separate counts in an indictment.
78. Within three days after defendants are held for action of the grand jury all of the
bills of indictment are forwarded to the indictment division from the court computer sec-
tion. Typists insert the appropriate information pertaining to the particular case in the
bills of indictment. The bills are then placed in the trial file to await the expiration of the
ten day delay from preliminary hearing to grand jury as required by the PA. R. Csum. P.
203(c).
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III. TRIAL
The Crimes Code is not simply a recodification of substantive crimes
replacing and "modernizing" the Penal Code of 1939. The new Crimes
Code contains significant provisions, three of which are discussed be-
low, which will change the conduct and course of all criminal trials in
the state. It is these provisions perhaps which will have the most sig-
nificant impact on the administration of criminal justice in Pennsyl-
vania.
A. Former Jeopardy
In Benton v. Maryland,1 9 the United States Supreme Court held that
the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment applies to the states
through the fourteenth amendment.8 0 Since Benton, the scope of dou-
ble jeopardy (and the related principle of collateral estoppel) has been
expanded by both federal and state courts in recognition of the poten-
tial harm in allowing the government to bring interminable prosecu-
tions arising from the same criminal incident.81 The entire issue of
when and how double jeopardy should apply has now been handled in
statutory form in the Crimes Code. 2 For the first time in Pennsylvania,
the legislature has mandated the circumstances when a second prosecu-
tion is barred by a former prosecution for the same offense,s3 for a dif-
79. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
80. Prior to Benton, principles of double jeopardy were controlled in Pennsylvania by
its own constitutional provision, PA. CONsr. art. I, § 10, which provided that no person may
be twice placed in jeopardy of life or limb for the same offense. This provision was inter-
preted by the courts as only applicable to capital offenses. See Commonwealth v. Baker, 413
Pa. 105, 109-12 196 A.2d 382, 385-87 (1964). In non-capital cases double jeopardy principles
were inapplicable. However, the common law principles of autrefois convict or autrefois
acquit were available. These principles prevent a prosecution for an offense if the de-
fendant had already been convicted or acquitted of a lesser offense arising out of the same
alleged criminal incident. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 464 (1970).
81. In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), the United States Supreme Court applied
the principle of collateral estoppel to second and subsequent criminal trials. Similarly in
Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970), the Court prohibited a second prosecution in a
state court for acts which had been completely prosecuted on lesser charges in a court of
local jurisdiction. Double jeopardy principles have also been applied where a mistrial has
been declared improperly, thereby barring a second trial although the first trial never re-
sulted in a verdict. See, e.g., United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971); Commonwealth v.
Brown, 451 Pa. 395, 397, 301 A.2d 876, 878 (1973); Commonwealth v. Schaffer, 447 Pa. 91,
288 A.2d 727 (1972).
82. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 109-12 (1973). These sections as well as many
others are derived, often verbatim, from the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code
(Proposed Official Draft, May 4, 1962, with changes and editorial corrections, July 30, 1962).
The double jeopardy provisions of the Crimes Code were derived from sections 1.08-.11 of
the Model Penal Code.
83. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 109 (1973), which states:
When a prosecution is for a violation of the same provision of the statutes and is
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ferent offense arising out of the same criminal episode, 4 or by a former
prosecution in a different jurisdiction.8 5 The effect of this legislation
based upon the same facts as a former prosecution, it is barred by such former prosecu-
tion under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal. There is an acquittal if the
prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty by the trier of fact or in a de-
termination that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction. A finding
of guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of the greater inclusive offense,
although the conviction is subsequently set aside.
(2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the indictment had been found,
by a final order or judgment for the defendant, which has not been set aside, re-
versed, or vacated and which necessarily required a determination inconsistent
with a fact or a legal proposition that must be established for conviction of the
offense.
(3) The former prosecution resulted in a conviction. There is a conviction if the
prosecution resulted in a judgment of conviction which has not been reversed or
vacated, a verdict of guilty which has not been set aside and which is capable of
supporting a judgment, or a plea of guilty accepted by the court. In the latter two
cases failure to enter judgment must be a reason other than a motion of the de-
fendant.
(4) The former prosecution was improperly terminated after the first witness was
sworn but before a verdict, or after a plea of guilty was accepted by the court.
84. Id. § 110, which states:
Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision of the statutes than
a former prosecution or is based on different facts, it is barred by such former prosecu-
tion under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as defined
in section 109 of this title (relating to when prosecution barred by former prosecu-
tion for same offense) and the subsequent prosecution is for:
(i) any offense of which the defendant could have been convicted on the first
prosecution;
(ii) any offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal
episode, if such offense was known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the
time of the commencement of the first trial and was within the jurisdiction of
a single court unless the court ordered a separate trial of the charge of such of-
fense; or
(iii) the same conduct, unless:
(A) the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted
and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof
of a fact not required by the other and the law defining each of such offenses
is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil; or
(B) the second offense was not consummated when the former trial began.
(2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the indictment was found, by an
acquittal or by a final order or judgment for the defendant which has not been
set aside, reversed or vacated and which acquittal, final order or judgment neces-
sarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be established
for conviction of the second offense.
(3) The former prosecution was improperly terminated, as improper termination
is defined in section 109 of this title (relating to when prosecution barred by former
prosecution for same offense) and the subsequent prosecution is for an offense of
which the defendant could have been convicted had the former prosecution not
been improperly terminated.
85. Id. § 111, which states:
When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction of this Com-
monwealth and of the United States or another state, a prosecution in any such
other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this Commonwealth under
the following circumstances:
(1) The first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as defined in
section 109 of this title (relating to when prosecution barred by former prosecu-
tion for same offense) and the subsequent prosecution is based on the same con-
duct unless:
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is perhaps most significant in that it requires the state to consolidate
and try all known charges arising from the same incident or transaction
at one trial unless a court orders separate trials of the crimes.8 6 This
requirement places a heavy burden on police and prosecutors to care-
fully process cases at the arrest and pre-trial stages in order to insure
that all charges arising from a criminal incident are consolidated prior
to trial.8 7 While it can be stated that such cases can be reasonably ex-
pected and handled by the state, a completely different situation exists
where a criminal incident is prosecutable in more than one jurisdic-
tion.8 A second prosecution arising from the same incident may only
be instituted if it requires proof of a fact which was not required in
the first prosecution and if the laws defining the offenses in the first and
second prosecution are designed to prevent substantially different
evils.89 In this regard there is little a prosecutor can do to control the
actions of another state, county, or federal authority which initiates
prosecution before he can act. 90
(i) the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted and
the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact
not required by the other and the law defining each of such offenses is intended
to prevent a substantially different harm or evil; or
(ii) the second offense was not consummated when the former trial began.
(2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the indictment was found, by an
acquittal or by a final order or judgment for the defendant which has not been set
aside, reves or vacated and which acquittal, final order or judgment necessarily
required a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be established for
conviction of the offense of which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted.
86. After the Crimes Code had been enacted but before its effective date the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432
(1973). wherein it adopted as a matter of constitutional law the "same transaction standard"
set forth in CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 110 (1973). The same court in Commonwealth
v. Mills, 447 Pa. 163, 286 A.2d 638 (1971), reached the question of a state prosecution
following federal prosecution of the same criminal episode. That decision adopted in part
the same principle established by CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 111 (1973). Mr. Justice
Pomeroy in a concurring opinion stated that he would have adopted it outright, 447 Pa. at
173, 286 A.2d at 642.
87. This is especially troublesome in the City of Philadelphia where the municipal
court has jurisdiction over all cases where the maximum penalty for any individual crime is
five years or less. In all other cases jurisdiction lies in the common pleas court. Often a
case arising from the same criminal transaction may be pending in both courts and unless
detected and consolidated, the first trial will bar the second.
88. Regardless of whether the "other" jurisdiction is the United States, or another
state or county, there are often conflicting concerns of the two prosecutorial authorities
which prevent them from working together for the same goal. A serious state offense
may be considered trivial by the United States Attorney (or vice versa) and the latter
may negotiate a guilty plea for little or no punishment thereby preventing the state from
prosecuting its case unless it can establish the narrow exceptions described in CONSOL. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 111 (1973). In a similar vein, defense counsels will be able to "jurisdic-
tion shop" and proceed with the case in the forum most favorable to his client.
89. See id.
90. See note 88 supra.
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However, by requiring the litigation of all criminal charges arising
from one episode to one trial, there will be significant financial savings
to the state. In addition, citizens charged with crimes will have their
fates decided once and not be subjected to interminable litigation.
B. De Minimis Infractions
The Crimes Code confers upon judges the power to dismiss prose-
cutions if the judge finds that the criminal conduct charged was:
1. within customary license;
2. not actually causing the harm sought to be prevented by the law
defining the crime or causing harm too trivial to warrant conviction; or
3. is extenuated to such a degree that it cannot be regarded as for-
bidden by the General Assembly.91
Exercise of the power to dismiss prosecution pursuant to this section
requires that the judge file a written statement of his reasons for this
action.92
This section confers powers upon the courts which they have care-
fully denied themselves.93 Traditionally, a court or a jury has been re-
stricted to determining whether the state has proven that a crime has
been committed; the existence of mitigating circumstances has
been a matter for sentencing. Section 312 gives the judiciary power to
dismiss any prosecution at any stage or for any crime. The purpose of
the section was to "remove petty infractions from the category of crimi-
nal conduct. 94 This section, however, will be a potential weapon for
judicial abuse due to the sweeping language of the section. This situa-
tion could have been avoided by limiting the permissive range, of
crimes for which dismissal by a court under this section would be al-
lowed, as well as by establishing strict appellate scrutiny of any decision
to dismiss prosecution.
91. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 312 (1973).
92. Id. § 312(b). The purpose of this written statement is not stated nor are appellate
review standards, if any, described.
93. A trial judge cannot sustain a demurrer or grant a motion in arrest of judgment
unless he finds that the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom, when viewed
in a light most favorable to the prosecution does not establish that the crime has been
committed by this defendant. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ponton, 450 Pa. 40, 299 A.2d 634
(1972).
94. PBA CoMMENTs, supra note 5, at 7. Most petty infractions are screened by the
District Attorney's Office in Philadelphia through its Legal Counseling Program which
screens cases in the police station prior to arraignment. Those arrests which are without
sufficient cause or where evidence was obtained improperly are rejected for prosecution
as are most "de minimis" infractions.
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C. Justification as a Defense
Chapter 595 of the Crimes Code mandates those circumstances when
individuals will be justified in the use of conduct upon another person
which would otherwise be criminal. 96 Thus the Crimes Code defines
by statute concepts of self defense and other instances of "justified"
use of force. These concepts have traditionally been the subject of ju-
dicial and not legislative mandate.97 Unfortunately, the drafters of the
Crimes Code have, in their attempt to clarify and consolidate justifica-
tion defenses, placed the entire area of law in a state of confusion which
will plague trial courts for some time. This confusion is in part the
result of omission because the Crimes Code is silent as to the burden
of proof required when chapter 5 defenses are raised. Case law prior
to the enactment of the Crimes Code made it quite clear that justifica-
tion defenses were affirmative defenses which the defendant had the
burden of raising and proving by a preponderance of the evidence. 9
The Crimes Code, however, when it defines defenses other than in
chapter 5, on occasion places the burden of proof specifically on the
defendant,99 thereby creating the inference that the legislature by its
silence did not intend to shift the burden to the defense for justifica-
tion defenses.1 0 If appellate courts ultimately so construe this chapter,
95. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 501-10 (1973).
96. Id. § 503, is the general justification section and it provides:
(a) General rule.-Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm
or evil to himself or to another is justifiable if:
(1) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged;
J2) neither this title nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or de-
enses dealing with the specific situation involved; and
(3) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise
plainly appear.
(b) Choice of evils.-When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the
situation requiring a choice of harms or evils or in appraising the necessity for his
conduct, the justification afforded by this section is unavailable in a prosecution for
any offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to es-
tablish culpability.
The remaining sections deal with self-defense (id. § 505); justification in property crimes
(id. § 510); use of force in law enforcement (id. § 508) and other situations where otherwise
criminal conduct is sanctioned (id. §§ 504-10).
97. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Nelson, 294 Pa. 544, 547, 144 A. 542, 544 (1929).
98. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fisher, 439 Pa. 87, 264 A.2d 689 (1970).
99. Entrapment is a defense provided in chapter 3 of the Crimes Code. CONSOL. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 313 (1973). It has a specific subsection providing that the defendant
must prove this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. § 313(b). See also the de-
fense of mistake as to age, id. § 310, which is also an affirmative defense.
100. This inference is strongly supported by the fact that the Model Penal Code in
its justification chapter from which the Crimes Code justification chapter is derived,
clearly makes these defenses affirmative. MODEL PENAL CODE § 301(1). This language was
not adopted by the legislature.
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it will represent a radical departure from existing law and many con-
victions will be vacated in those cases where lower courts followed the
established concept that the defense has the burden of proving justi-
fication.10
The second complication of the justification defenses is that they
are so carefully detailed judges will be required to read them verbatim
to juries in order to avoid any deviation from the stated law which
might constitute reversible error. Unfortunately, it, is highly doubtful
that a juror, upon hearing the legislative definition of self-defense, will
be able to understand it and apply it to the facts in the case he is
hearing. 102
In the final analysis, it may be concluded that chapter 5 of the Crimes
Code was counter-productive to the goal of modernizing and stream-
lining the criminal justice system. This can be alleviated in part by
providing amendments clearly stating the required burden of proof
for chapter 5 and other defenses.
D. Sex Offenses
Forcible sex offenses are often the most difficult as well as the most
serious crimes to prosecute. There rarely are independent witnesses to
these offenses and trials are charged with emotional trauma to the vic-
tim. The Crimes Code made these crimes even more difficult to prose-
cute by providing that the jury. be instructed in all sex offense trials
"to evaluate the testimony of a victim or complaining witness with
special care in view of the emotional involvement of the witness and
the difficulty of determining the truth with respect to alleged sexual
activities carried out in private."'103 This jury instruction made a con-
viction for a sexual offense almost impossible in the absence of corrobo-
rative evidence0 4 because it forced the judge to tell the jury that there
101. Even worse, appellate courts might adopt a case-by-case approach to this question
and provide different rules for different chapter 4 sections. This would leave trial judges
in a very tenuous position for many years.
102. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 505(a) (1973), which states: "Use of force justifi-
able for protection of the person.. . . The use of force upon or toward another person is
justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose
of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the pres-
ent occasion."
103. Id. § 3106.
104. There rarely is corroborative evidence strong enough to overcome this" jury in-
struction. Where there is no corroborative evidence regarding the forcible nature of the
crime, a defendant remains protected by his presumption of innocence and the prosecutor
has the burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. He is also protected by
the right to cross-examine his accuser. Only when the victim's testimony is so credible
as to overcome these obstacles is he convicted. ,
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is virtually a presumption of reasonable doubt regarding the veracity
of the victim's testimony. The drafters of the Crimes Code stated that
this provision "does not change existing law." However, they cited no
authority for this proposition.10 5
This section came under attack from various groups and was re-
pealed by the legislature because of public pressure. Repeal of this
section was essential to prosecution of sex offenses because the legis-
lature had established a virtually impossible burden of proof for con-
viction. 106
IV. CONCLUSION
The difficulty with the new Crimes Code, as illustrated by the prob-
lems enumerated in this article, is the adoption of substantive and pro-
cedural rules promulgated initially in 1953 in some cases107 and adopted
in 1962.108 The legal and constitutional questions and issues of 1974
are quite different than those apparent to the drafters of the Model
Penal Code in the 1950's. For example, with no exclusionary rule in
the states until 1961,109 the distinction between misdemeanors and
felonies could not have the same meaning or effect on police conduct
as is now possible.110 Similarly, with increased use by prosecutors of
screening and rehabilitative disposition in the 1960's and 1970's,"' the
formal enactment of power of dismissal of petty yet valid cases by the
court may be an overresponse and an interference with prosecutorial
discretion.112
Thus, when the drafters of the new Crimes Code reviewed the Model
Penal Code, they were philosophically limited because of their refer-
ence to the sometimes dated concepts and wording found in the Model
Penal Code. Even then, the institution of sweeping changes in the old
penal laws by eliminating offenses and restructuring others"3 was po-
105. To date this writer has discovered no precedent in Pennsylvania requiring this
instruction. This section therefore departs from existing law and may serve to protect
the guilty rather than the innocent. See PBA COMMENTS, supra note 5, at 16.
106. Act No. 115, § 2, Purdon's Legislative Service Vol. 3 (1973).
107. See MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953). There are thirteen drafts, tenta-
tive draft number 13 being promulgated on April 19, 1961.
108. See MODEL PENAL CODE (Prop. Offic. Draft 1962).
109. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
110. See text at notes 12-25 supra.
111. See NATIONAL ADIvsoRY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GoALs, A
NATIONAL STRATEGY TO REDUCE CRIME 143-48 (1973); PA. R. CRiM. P. 175-85.
112. See text at notes 91-95 supra.
115. Thus, abortion and consensual homosexuality are maintained as crimes. See PBA
COMMENTS, supra note 5, at ii. In addition, article 6, "Miscellaneous Offenses," maintains
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litically impossible. Finally, the adoption of a new Crimes Code with-
out concurrent adoption of legislation as to sentencing and sentencing
alternatives, which was proposed simultaneously, leaves practitioners
and judges with not even "half a loaf."
The new Crimes Code, with its inherent legal problems and delays,
was effective at the same time as new procedural rules114 requiring
prompt trials. Prosecutors, defense counsel and the court must not only
learn, apply, and test new definitions, new crimes and new penalties,
but must also respond to new requirements as to timing of cases, delays
of cases, and exceptions to rules. The fear is chaos. The probability is,
at the least, confusion.
most of the unknown offenses, such as CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 6702 (1973), pro.
hibiting sales of veterans' flowers and id. § 7316, prohibiting keeping a bucket-shop. PA.
R. CiuM. P. 1100.
114. PA. R. CaM. P. 1100.
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